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NOTES
THE PRE-INDICTMENT SUPPRESSION OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSIONS
A right to seek the pre-indictment suppression of tangible evidence
gained from an illegal search and seizure has been generally recognized.,
Suppression is accomplished by a civil suit to enjoin use of the evidence,
or by a "motion" to suppress relying on a broad judicial interpretation
of federal Rule 41 (e). A later statute established a similar procedure for
suppressing wiretap and related evidence2 -an expansion necessitated by
removal of the "tangible" limitation long applied to fourth amendment
violations. In 1947, in the case of In re Fried, similar expansion was
effected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the results of fifth
amendment violations, specifically unconstitutionally obtained
confessions.3
Apparently, few attorneys have followed the lead of Fried's counsel in
filing a pre-indictment motion to suppress unconstitutionally obtained
confessions. Indeed, the remedy usually is either ignored or receives
cursory attention in treatments of the rules of federal criminal
procedure, the criminal justice system or criminal defense tactics.4 In
view of the potential benefits of employing the procedure, it deserves
more considered attention. This note will examine In re Fried and
subsequent case law which defines the Fried procedure or clarifies the
scope of the remedy. Despite the absence of explicit discussion of the
procedure in the new proposed federal rules of criminal procedure, 5 the
relationship between them and the Fried developments will also be
discussed. Lastly, the use of the Fried remedy as a criminal defense tactic
will be considered.
I. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 673 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT]. This, in turn, codified an existing practice dating at least from Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule modified existing case law only in requiring that the motion be made
before the court rather than, as permitted under prior practice, the Commissioner. See also Smith v.
Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
3. 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 331 U.S. 858, cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807 (1947).
4. E.g., WRIGHT § 673 n. 23 and accompanying text. The availability is also sometimes
expressly negated, e.g., I A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER. TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 224(B) (1967).
5. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547, 582-87 passim, 628-633 passim (1970).
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I. IN RE FRIED
Phillip Fried and others were suspected of possession of a large quan-
tity of stolen crude rubber. A warrant for "knowing possession of goods
stolen in foreign commerce" was issued.6
The warrant was executed in several places. First, one Neary was
arrested on the premises of the "Special Formula Chemical Company"
where Fried conducted a rubber cement business. Incident to Neary's
arrest, a search was conducted. Neary signed a written waiver of the
right to be served with a search warrant as a condition to searching the
premises. An investigation of the premises yielded two bales of rubber
matching the description of the stolen property. Business records were
also examined; some were seized but subsequently returned as innocent
goods. Later the same day, FBI agents arrested Fried and another
suspect, Birnbaum, at their homes. The evidence indicated that neither
was informed of the reasons for his arrest. 7
At FBI headquarters, the subjects were denied permission to contact
their lawyers, none received dinner, and each was separately and
intensively interrogated by FBI agents working in shifts.' The
interrogations continued well into the night, until each began to give
"satisfactory answers". All three ultimately signed confessions Fried's
subsequent petition alleged that the agents who arrested him threatened
and abused him and that he was reduced to a state of hysteria by the
interrogation. 0 The following morning, all three subjects were arraigned
before a U.S. Commissioner, where each specifically denied the facts
attested in the signed confessions.
Prior to indictment, each petitioned the district court for return of the
seized documents and suppression of the confessions, alleging that the
confessions were obtained by violating petitioner's rights to prompt
arraignment and by other unlawful means." At the hearing, Judge
Rifkind dismissed the petitions for the suppression of the confessions as
premature.' 2 He grounded his conclusion in two factors: first, the lack of
precedent for such an application; and second, the practical
disadvantage of burdening the court with additional pretrial motions.,'
6. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961, 965 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
7. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 457.
1I. 68 F. Supp. at 961-62.
12. Id. at 961.
13. Id. at 962-63.
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The prayer for suppression of the tangible evidence was rejected on the
merits. 4 On appeal, the second circuit affirmed Rifkind's denial of the
motion to suppress the tangible evidence. 15 A majority reversed the trial
court's decision as to the confession, holding that confessions shown to
be a result of constitutional violations may be suppressed prior to
indictment."s
A. Jurisdiction
Of significance in evaluating Fried's continued utility to a criminal
defendant is the jurisdictional basis for pre-indictment suppression of
unconstitutionally obtained confessions. Although never explicitly
identifying the jurisdictional basis on which it decides the issue, the court
appears to rely on its general supervisory powers, over officers of the
court-including United States Attorneys. Judge Frank, who wrote the
majority opinion, noted that "the court 'may reach forward' to control
the presentation, in a case before it, of evidence acquired through the
unlawful conduct of federal officers."'17 This statement recognizes a line
of cases reaching back to 1844 in which the court's supervisory
jurisdiction has been employed. 8 That the majority in Fried reasons by
analogy to Rule 41(e) further supports this thesis. Rule 41(e) itself
codifies case law-imposed limitations on the use of seized evidence which
were grounded in the exercise of the supervisory power. 9
14. Id. at 965-66.
15. 161 F.2dat457.
16. Id. at 460.
17. Id. at 458.
18. The existence of supervisory jurisdiction was first declared by the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844): "There is inherent in every court a power to supervise
the conduct of its officers, and the execution of its judgments and process. Without this power,
courts would be wholly impotent and useless." Supervisory power has consistently been recognized
by federal courts since Griffin. E.g., Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Dixon v. District of
Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D. D.C. 1969);
see also Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (1969); Note,
The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050 (1965); Note, The
Supervisory Power ofthe Federal Courts. 76 HARV. L. Rav. 1656 (1963).
19. See Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1933); Note, Exclusion of Incompetent
Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 595 (1963). In arguing by
analogy to Rule 41(e), Judge Frank did not intend that the decision in Fried be interpreted as an
extension of Rule 41(e) to include confessions. The government had argued that 41(e) rested on a
"property right", an element not present with confessions. Noting that 41(e) permitted the
suppression of contraband, to which no property right could be said to exist, Frank sought to focus,
rather than on the rule itself, on its equitable base.
Learned Hand's "consistency" argument (see notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text) was not
designed to imply that confessions were to be suppressed by the established motion, but that a
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Because it is based on the supervisory power, a pre-indictment motion
to suppress confessions becomes subject to both legislative intervention
in the scope of its exercise 2 and alteration by the Supreme Court.2 1
B. Theoretical Bases for Pre-indictment Suppression of Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Confessions
The court in Fried presents three arguments for exercising its
supervisory power to extend prior uses of the pre-indictment motion to
suppress. The first two appear in the body of Judge Frank's opinion; the
third in that of Judge Learned Hand.
1. Deterrence-The first argument is the now familiar one that, if the
fruits of official transgression are immediately suppressible, the
government will be less inclined to commit such transgressions. As there
is a social interest in deterring the illegal practices of federal law
enforcement officials in securing coerced confessions, it seems logical
that the means used should be as effective as practical in effectuating
that value, and that denying to erring officials the use of illegal evidence
to obtain an indictment is such a means. 22
2. A voiding wrongful indictment-An individual clearly has an
interest in not being wrongfully indicted. As Judge Frank notes, an
individual may be greatly harmed by an indictment alone, even if it never
results in a trial.23
motion to suppress an unconstitutionally obtained confession was to be given treatment, in an
independent and separate motion, equal to 41 (e).
Evidence that the parties to the original action so understood the judges' intention is contained in
their briefs on appeal. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United States v. Fried, 331 U.S. 803
(1947); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, United States v. Fried, 331 U.S. 803 (1947).
20. Compare cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), with 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c)
(1969).
21. See discussion infra of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
22. Prosecutors have an immense discretion in instituting criminal proceedings which may
lastingly besmirch reputation. That discretion is almost completely unfettered. It should
surely not extend so far as to preclude judicial interference with a prosecutor's whim to
induce an indictment by offering to a grand jury evidence which is the product of illegal acts
of federal officers.
Until such miserable behavior is stamped out, it will remain an empty boast that we have,
and that we respect, a Constitution which guarantees civil liberties, and blocks representa-
tives of government from lawless incursions on the rights of the individual.
161 F.2d at 459.
23. In our democratic society, only a hardened cynic will assert that to convict an innocent
man, through mistaken fact-finding induced by his coerced confession, should be a matter of
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3. Consistency-Judge Learned Hand relied more explicitly on the
analogy to pre-indictment suppression of tangible evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. Noting that he could not "see any
rational basis for distinguishing between the [fourth and fifth]
amendments when the situation is so nearly the same," he argued that he
felt "too much the force of consistency not to take this added step. ' 24
Judge Augustus Hand wrote a dissenting opinion which rejected the
remedy of pre-indictment suppression of unconstitutionally obtained
confessions. His dissent rested on two practical arguments: first, he was
not convinced that such a motion was necessary to prevent substantial
injustice because the harm to an accused would be no greater than he
would suffer from the grand jury's consideration of other incompetent-
evidence;2' second, he feared that such motions would overburden the
courts.26
C. Evidence to be Suppressed
The Fried extension is narrowly limited to confessions which are
obtained by infractions of constitutional rights.27 Judge Frank, however,
goes farther and registers a partial dissent. He argues that a confession
obtained in violation of a federal statute should also be suppressed prior
to indictment. To illustrate his point, he adverted to the basis for the
invalidity of the confession in McNabb v. United States,2' although
noting that McNabb, unlike Fried, filed his application after he had
been indicted. 2' Frank argues that "McNabb" confessions should also
no great concern, since the conviction will help to create or preserve public respect for the
"substantive" criminal rule which the court applied-although erroneously-fully as much
as if the man were guilty, provided only that the mistake is never publicly disclosed. And
only such a cynic will say that the public welfare is similarly served by indictment of the
innocent, induced by grand-jury misfinding of the fact, when an indictment is followed by an
acquittal of which the public never learns. As a wrongful indictment inflicts a substantial
harm on the indicted person, infringing his "substantive right" to be exempt from such
harm, the courts should actively repudiate the cynic's view. Since preventive justice is usually
the best sort of justice, the courts, I think, should try, by all feasible means to forestall such
harms.
Id. at 464-65.
24. Id. at 465.
25. Id. at 465, 466; see discussion of United States v. Costello, note 64 infra and accompanying
text.
26. "1 am confident that it will multiply dilatory motions and impede prosecuting officers
without, except in rare instances, affording defendants any relief not available at the trial." 161 F.2d
at 465,466.
27. Id. at 460.
28. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
29. 161 F.2d at460.
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be suppressible prior to indictment: ". . . the reason for suppressing a
confession procured by a violation of a constitutional privilege is solely
the illegality of the means used in procuring it; and the means are just as
illegal if they consist of official transgression of a federal statute."3 He
further contended that statutory violations, when recognized as such by
an accused, tend themselves to be coercive by increasing the accused's
feeling of helplessness and so diminishing the trustworthiness of what he
says.3
Because other categories of sanctioned evidence-e.g., incompetent,
irrelevant-are not discussed in the Fried opinion they are not expressly
rejected in it. One may, however, infer that the motion made available by
Fried would not extend to such evidence. First, the majority limited the
remedy to unconstitutionally obtained confessions. Secondly, Augustus
Hand's discussion of the lack of real distinction in terms of harm
between the use against an accused of incompetent evidence and the use
of an unconstitutionally obtained confession, supports the inference that
Fried may not support the pre-indictment suppression of merely
incompetent evidence. Lastly, this conclusion is supported by two facts:
first, Judge Frank confined his discussion to illegally obtained evidence
in his "partial dissent"; and second, he asserted that the extension
effected by Fried would not lead to a pre-trial "trial of the evidence".
II. POST-FRIED CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND DENIAL OF THE PRE-
INDICTMENT SUPPRESSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED
CONFESSIONS
A. Pre-Indictment Suppression of Confessions
Most federal courts called upon to rule on the Fried procedure have
approved the Fried holding. 32 It should be noted, however, that much of
30. Id.
31. Id. at 461. See also J. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942).
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Austin v. United States, 297
F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1961) [The continuing force of this is questionable, however, as the order issued
was subsequently withdrawn without opinion owing to an intervening Supreme Court decision
indicating that the order appealed from was interlocutory (see WRIGHT § 673 n. 23)]; Lapides v.
United States, 215 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1954); Plato v. Katzenbach, 253 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. N.Y.
1966); United States v. Quinn, 17 F.R.D. 342 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
In the first circuit, Centracchio v. Garrity is generally seen as having rejected the Fried holding.
198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952). Centracchio concerned a taxpayer's
confessions and turning over of books, supposedly under a promise of non-prosecution; the
Treasury Department was operating at that time on a voluntary disclosure policy. The court found
that ihe evidence was voluntarily given and that no fourth or fifth amendment rights were infringed.
[Vol. 1971:73
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the approval does not go beyond dicta found in cases reflecting often
urged efforts to extend the Fried remedy beyond the suppression of
unconstitutionally obtained confessions. In many respects, a proper
construction of Fried's current status in the law depends on the
differences present in these cases.
1. Confessions Unconstitutionally Obtained
Citations to Fried generally note that the majority holding in Fried
was confined to violations of fifth amendment rights. Most courts so
citing Fried were presented with confessions obtained in this manner.
Several, however, did not concern unconstitutionally obtained
confessions, and an approval of Fried was juxtaposed with a refusal to
extend the remedy to confessions obtained in violation of statutes.3
2. Confessions Obtained in Violation of Statute
Two cases support an extension of Fried to all illegally obtained
confessions, but they lack fact patterns which squarely raise the issue.
United States v. Carabasis" cited Frank's argument with approval, but
the confession in question was obtained in violation of Carabasi's
constitutional rights. United States v. Klapholz 35 approved pre-
indictment suppression of illegally, though not unconstitutionally,
obtained tangible evidence. One may, however, equate the arguments in
these cases with Frank's own argument to support such an extension.
The case is, therefore, distinguishable from Fried on its facts, although it is fair to imply that the
Centracchio court would not approve an extension to illegal evidence or confessions obtained in a
manner violating a statute. Some strong disapproval of Fried is evident in the court's dicta-"It
would not seem to be in the public interest to enlarge the recognized category of dilatory motions at
the pre-indictment stage. ... (Id. at 388)-but the court was careful to point out that it expressed
no "opinion as to the correctness" of Fried. Id. at 387. See also Biggs v. United States, 246 F.2d 40
(6th Cir. 1957) (finding that no violation of constitutional rights occurred, with citation to
Centracchio and expressing a view that Fried extended preindictment suppression only to
unconstitutionally obtained confessions, relief was denied); Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.
1955).
33. United States v. Quinn, 17 F.R.D. 342 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); United States v. Tuzzo, 9 F.R.D.
466 (D. N.J. 1949). Other cases, presenting tangible evidence seized in violation of statutory rules,
argue for an opposite conclusion. For example, United States v. Klapholz presented a 41(e) motion
to suppress evidence seized in violation of Rule 5(a). The petitioner utilized Frank's "partial
dissent" to support his argument that rule violations were, like fourth amendment violations,
subject to sanction under 41(e). The court-citing Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), as
blurring the distinction between fourth amendment and rule violations-ruled that 41(e) would be
available for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence. 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956).
34. 218 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Carabasi concerned confessions obtained by fraudulent
representations that no prosecution would occur.
35. 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956); see also note 36 supra.
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Indeed, a developing pattern of judicial blurring of the historical
distinction between illegally obtained tangible evidence and that
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment provides a compelling
argument for the position posited by Frank in Fried. It should be noted,
however, that Congress is increasingly unfavorable to exclusion based
solely on rule violations. The example of the Omnibus Crime Bill
limitation on the Mallory rule 31-significantly, the rule violation
typically appearing in these cases 3 -is the clearest. Therefore, although
Frank's argument finds support in the post-Fried development,
prospects for realization seem slight.
To this point, however, no cases provide firm precedent for the pre-
indictment suppression of confessions obtained in violation of statute.
No cases have been found presenting the issue of pre-indictment
suppression of incompetent evidence and Fried, in any event, offers no
support for such a great extension of the 41 (e) rationale.38
B. Bases for Pre-Indictment Suppression of Unconstitutional
Confessions
Few courts construing Fried rely exclusively on one theoretical basis
for the pre-indictment suppression of unconstitutional confessions. In
Austin v. United States,31 for example, consistency between protection of
fifth and fourth amendment rights is argued together with an argument
reflecting the deterrence rationale. Yet other cases, instead of extending
blanket approval of suits to enjoin prosecutors from any use of such a
confession, emphasize the inherent harmfulness of basing the indictment
on the unconstitutionally obtained confession. Thus, Plato v.
Katzenbach4 ° holds that the right to suppress attaches when the
36. Compare Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501(c), (d)
(1969).
37. E.g., In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
38. But see Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1955) ["... the competency or
incompetency of the evidence obtained through appellant's claimed reliance upon the Treasury's
'voluntary disclosure' policy should not be determined in a pre-indictment proceeding of this
kind .. " (dicta)]; Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 387-88 (1st Cir. 1952) (". . . even the
majority opinion in the Fried case recognized that it was 'not feasible to enjoin the presentation to
grand juries of all untrue, irrelevant or incompetent evidence'. . . . It would not seem to be in the
public interest to enlarge the recognized category of dilatory motions at the pre-indictment stage,
which would have the effect of impeding prosecuting officers, without, except in rare instances,
affording defendants any relief not available after indictment or during trial." The petition had
alleged constitutional violations but was rejected because the evidence sought to be suppressed
seemed to be possibly inadmissible but not unconstitutionally obtained.).
39. 297 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1961).




prosecutors move to the grand jury seems probable. Relief was denied in
Plato as the prosecutor had done nothing to indicate that a grand jury
investigation was imminent. Although Plato did not involve a
confession, it supported this statement by citation to Fried as the
expression of policy in the area. The same rationale is implicit in United
States v. Tuzzo,4" which did involve a confession. Relief was denied in
Tuzzo because an indictment had already been returned and the harm
was done--defendant now had to wait until trial. Tuzzo characterized
Fried as designed mainly to avoid wrongful indictment.
III. THE FRIED REMEDY UNDER THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
An examination of the arguments in Fried and its progeny reveals that
their theoretically independent underpinnings are neither usually
separated nor easily separable. Any analysis, however, must recognize
that the arguments ultimately center on whether it is necessary-or even
desirable-to equate the techniques for protecting the citizenry against
fifth amendment violations with those available to protect against fourth
amendment violations. What must be remembered is that the rights
themselves came before particular remedies. The difference is between
rule and sanction, although the sanction may be, or may become, so
critical as to be inseparable from the rule itself. Thus, when the rule
reflects a constitutional imperative, the sanction may or may not be part
of that constitutional imperative. The classic illustration, of course, is
found in the history of the fourth amendment's search and seizure clause
and its application to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. Wolf v. Colorado42 established a constitutional rule that
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures bound the
states, but it did not find a constitutional requirement that enforcement
occur through application of the exclusionary sanction. In 1963, Mapp
did find such a requirement in the Constitution, and so the sanction as
well as the rule became part of the constitutional mandate.43
But there is no reason in logic for concluding that the additional
sanction of precluding the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
obtaining indictments either (1) should or should not be adopted, or (2)
that, if adopted, it should automatically become part of the
41. 9 F.R.D. 466 (D. N.J. 1949).
42. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
43. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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constitutional mandate against violations of the fourth amendment. And
so it is with the extension of the pre-indictment exclusion sanction to
unconstitutionally obtained confessions. Indeed, there would seem to be
no constitutional requirement that the admissibility of confessions
claimed to have been obtained by unconstitutional means be determined
before trial at all, although a requirement that the trial judge preclude
unconstitutionally obtained confessions as a matter of law has been
made part of the constitutional imperative itself by Jackson v. Denno.41
And, indeed, it is quite clear that whatever else may be the status of
Fried, it is not of constitutional dimension. Against that background, an
examination of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and their relationship to the Fried doctrine is
indicated.
The proposal for amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure eliminates the 41 (e) motion,45 except for a motion limited to
seeking return of property. Instead, the motion to suppress must now be
brought in a pre-trial setting held sometime after arraignment." The
appropriate time to move for exclusion of confessions -with an
exception for the Fried procedure, conventionally considered to be at
trial-is moved back to this hearing as well. The clear intent of the
proposal is to hear all motions for exclusion together and at one time;
44. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
45. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547 (1970). Rule 41(e) as it reads in the proposed amendment is
titled "Motion for Return of Property". Id. 627. A new subsection is proposed 41(o, titled
"Motion to Suppress". It provides:
(f) MOrbON TO SuPPRass. A motion to suppress evidence may be made in the court of the
district of trial as provided in rule 12.
Id. 628. Rule 12 has been altered to read in pertinent portions (changes are indicated with italics
for new wording and strikeouts for deletions):
(b) PRETRIAL MOTIONS. Any defense, or objection, or request which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.
(2) Defenses and Objections must be raised. The following must be raised prior to trial:
(3) Motions to suppress evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained; or
(C) MOTION DATE. Unless otherwiseprovided by local rule, the court may, at the time of the
arraignment or as soon thereafter as practicable, set a time for the making of pretrial
motions and, if required, a later date for hearing.
Id. 579-80.
46. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts 12, 12(b)(3) and 12(c), 48 F.R.D. 547,579-80 (1970). The specific language is




and as the time for the hearing is set at arraignment, this will necessarily
be post-indictment. The rules as proposed to be amended do permit a
court to vary this schedule;47 but as they reflect, first, a policy choice to
hear all motions together, and second, to hear them after arraignment,
adoption of the rules would provide little incentive to so vary.
Unless a choice is made to tie 41(e) and the Fried procedure more
firmly to a notion that the timing they embody is a due process
requirement-an unlikely notion-adoption of the proposed
amendments would abolish the remedy. The appropriateness of this
great change requires some scrutiny of both the policies underlying the
initial choice for the remedies and some reflection of the value of reviving
the Fried procedure itself.
The policies, discussed primarily in relation to the Fried remedy but
similarly applicable to 41(e), may be summarized as: (1) deterring
disapproved conduct of police and prosecutor; and (2) avoiding wrong-
ful indictment. Both reflect values articulated in the fourth or fifth
amendment and show concern with adherence to the mandates of those
amendments.
A revival of the Fried remedy may be considered to have potential
impact in the following areas: (1) on plea bargaining; and (2) on
derivative evidence.
(1) Plea bargaining-To opposing parties in a criminal case, Fried's
importance lies in its effect on the ultimate disposition of the case. As
guilty pleas account for up to 90% of convictions, 4 and as many if not
most of these pleas are at least substantially attributable to bargaining
between prosecutor and defendant, the effect of an available additional
pre-indictment suppression motion on the bargain process must be
considered.
It is often expressed that a demand for trial would place the judicial
system in danger of collapse. 4' This assumption, coupled with the
resource limitations of the prosecutor's office itself,50 make bargaining
47. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts 12, 12(c), 48 F.R.D. 547, 580 (1970).
48. See, e.g.. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 4 (1967). See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 97-112, 132-35 (D. McIntyre, Jr. ed. 1967); D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
49. See Goldman & Holt, How Justice Works: The People vs. Donald Payne, NEWSWEEK,
March 8, 1971, at 20, 32.
50. See generally F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
(1969).
Vol. 1971:73]
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attractive to the prosecutor. A conviction is never a sure thing and the
spectre of Miranda diminishes that certainty in many cases involving
confessions. 51
If a defendant has his confession suppressed prior to indictment by a
Fried motion, he immediately knows that the confession may not be used
as evidence against him, either at trial or in procuring an indictment.
This will either markedly improve his bargaining stance, if the
suppressed confession is only a part of the evidence against the
defendant; or, if the confession is the substance of the prosecution case,
will free the defendant from prosecution. If, however, he should make his
motion and have it denied, his bargaining position is not only weakened
but is practically lost, for now the prosecutor knows he has an
admissible confession and with such evidence there is little else needed to
convict. 52 Thus, it would seem that-unless suppression is a
certainty-the defendant's most beneficial use of the motion is to wield it
as a threat, much in the manner of other available procedures with
dilatory aspects, not to actually invoke it. Essentially then, the Fried
procedure, apart from the notion of avoiding wrongful indictment and
attendent publicity, adds to the arsenal of defense delay tactics as to a
different class of evidence-confessions -and operationally may insure
the defendant a more favorable bargaining outcome. Reasons exist for
denying this outcome, but they are really arguments with the bargaining
institution itself. Certainly in a system which sanctions bargaining,
whatever the philosophical difficulties, the improvement of a defendant's
bargaining position can not be condemned out of hand.
Additionally, a wider recognition of the availability of the Fried
procedure would cause defense attorneys, in every case involving a
confession, to consider a suit to enjoin its use by the prosecutor.
Assuming that the admissibility of the confession is in doubt, both
defense and prosecution may wish to avoid the suit, with the result that
negotiation of the plea may be accelerated and occur before indictment,
removing some costly stages of the prosecution. A defendant in this
situation would waive his indictment and his right to motions, and
proceed to arraignment prepared to plead to an agreed upon charge. 3
51. For two surveys evaluating the effect of the Miranda decision on police interrogations and the
use of confessions to obtain a conviction, see Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-a
Statistical Study, 29 U. P'rr. L. Rsv. 1 (1967); Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
52. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,466 (1966).
53. A prosecutor may charge a suspect when the only evidence is a confession if he believes that
the confession may induce a guilty plea. This problem was discussed by the Supreme Court in
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(2) Derivative evidence-Exclusion of tangible evidence discovered as a
result of the defendant's illegal confession has been generally
unsuccessful.54 Although derivative evidence was not a part of the law of
confessions prior to Miranda, Miranda may include such a rule.55 One
commentator points out that the Miranda opinion refers three times
expressly to "evidence and its fruits" as being inadmissible, indicating
that an extension of the derivative evidence rule was contemplated."
Other support for this position lies in the Court's general posture in past
cases of including derivative evidence within the protection against self-
incrimination, 7 and its use of the rule in other context. 58 Whether or not
dictated by Miranda, the evolvement of a derivative evidence rule
applying to confessions seems imminent.5 9 Under such an extension, the
Fried remedy becomes increasingly attractive. If a potential defendant
could suppress both the confession and the derivative evidence, his
bargaining position would be strengthened considerably. The second
circuit has approved the extension of Fried to such evidence in Lapides v.
United States. 0
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Inducement follows because the defendant's decision
to plead guilty or not guilty turns on whether he feels the law will allow the confession to be used
against him. McMann did not find that this dilemma made the choice involuntary as a matter of
law. For a discussion of the judicially determined parameters of voluntariness and a collection of
cases, see Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Understanding of Guilty
Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289.
54. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (refusal to suppress
eyewitness); but see Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (excluding evidence
obtained through illegal-though not unconstitutional--confession).
55. See George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. COLO. L. REv.
478,485-90 (1967).
56. Id.
57. E.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Counselman v. United States, 142
U.S. 547 (1892).
58. The derivative evidence rule was first enunciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). It held that not only did the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment
apply to the direct evidence received in an unlawful search, but also to the indirect evidence, or that
which would not have been available but for the unlawful search. Derivative evidence may be
admissible, however, if knowledge of it is gained from an independent source. Id. at 392. Justice
Frankfurter first coined the term "Fruit of the poisonous tree" to describe derivative evidence in
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), which held that the connection between the lawless
conduct of the police and the discovery of the evidence, for it to be admissible, must "become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 341. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),
held that verbal evidence was equally subject to taint and might fall within the rule excluding
derivative evidence.
59. In forming such a rule, the probable increase in Jackson v. Denno hearings [see Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)] would have to he weighed against the interest of the individual to
suppress derivative evidence, unless suppression would be defined as a constitutional requirement.
The close link with Miranda makes the latter probable.
60. 215 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1954).Washington University Open Scholarship
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An evaluation of the change made by the proposed amendments
requires a consideration of the merits of all of the above factors:
deterring improper official conduct; avoiding wrongful indictment; and,
improved tactical advantage in plea bargaining for a potential
defendant. Furthermore, the deterrence or wrongful basis must
contemplate not only confessions but probably derivative evidence as
well.
IV. CONCLUSION
This note has demonstrated that a right to pre-indictment suppression
of unconstitutionally obtained confessions pertains, at least in the
federal system. 6' It has been further indicated that proposed amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will eliminate the remedy, as
well as its fourth amendment analogue the 41 (e) pre-indictment motion
to suppress tangible evidence, at least when no property right exists. 2
Instead, the proposals move all such motions into a post-
arraignment/pre-trial setting.Y
This movement may not be characterized as an attempt to align
fourth and fifth amendment protection-although in fact, by including
illegal evidence, protection is increased in one sense-for the availability
of the Fried remedy performed this function, and the authors of the
proposed amendments must have certainly been aware of Fried.
Evaluation of the amendments must instead focus on the policy choice to
place all motions in the same forum at the same time, specifically post-
arraignment/pre-trial. This choice must be analyzed in terms of the
deterrence and wrongful indictment arguments" underlying Fried and
61. See note 35 supra.
62. See notes 45-47 supra.
63. See note 46 supra.
64. Developments in the law relative to evidence before the grand jury seem to reinforce this
concern, or alternatively argue for an explicit rejection of the "harm" seen to accrue from wrongful
indictment. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), held that an indictment could issue even
though the grand jury heard no competent evidence. United States v. Blue, 382 U.S. 251 (1966),
added that a petitioner could not have his indictment dismissed on the ground that it was based upon
unconstitutional evidence. The ability of a grand jury to hear any category of evidence, posited in
Costello and Blue, does not preclude preindictment motions such as the 41(e) or Fried motions.
Those cases do, however, indicate that if the petitions are not made, the evidence will be heard by the
grand jury and may support an indictment. These cases do however climax a series of cases which
progressively diminished post-indictment review of the grand jury proceedings. Other procedural
changes, such as the apparent ability of U.S. Attorneys to skip over the preliminary hearing and
move directly into the grand jury setting under § 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 [18
U.S.C. § 3060 (1969)]-see Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the
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41(e) and in terms of more basic system dynamics--especially plea
bargaining. With the demonstrated ability of courts to themselves effect
consistency, and with the example of Fried, that argument will not
support the rule changes proposed. Rather, a squaring of the
contemplated changes with the policy and actuality of pre-indictment
suppression as a deterrent technique, as well as consideration of the
harm of indictment based on improper evidence and the social
undesirability of ignoring such harm, pose the real issues.
Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH.
L. Rav. 1361 (1969)-aggravate these problems.
Avoiding the preliminary hearing lessens the possibility that an accused will "discover" what
evidence will be presented to the grand jury, which in substantial measure decreases his ability to
take advantage of the available Fried motion or the 41 (e) motion; review over the grand jury use of
unconstitutional or illegal evidence has been similarly contracted. The removal of the pre-
indictment motions under the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
merely completes the circle. The propriety of the noted contraction may not only be argued in terms
of general social policy, but may be questioned in a constitutional light. Miranda, Escobedo, et al.
establish a logical basis for the theory that the introduction of coerced confessions as testimony in
any criminal proceeding is a separate and independent violation of the self-incrimination privilege.
As the privilege extends to custodial interrogation, a confession obtained in violation of that
privilege must be excluded at trial to prevent a violation of due process. It is perhaps fair to infer
that a grand jury hearing is a "criminal proceeding" sufficient to allow characterization of its use of
the unconstitutionally obtained confession as violative of due process, much like such use at trial.
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